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UNCITRAL TRANSPARENCY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2014 INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION TRANSPARENCY RULES AND THEIR EFFECT ON INVESTOR-STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES AND ECONOMIC FAIRNESS
By
Kayla Kelly-Slatten1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2002, Pacific Rim Mining Corporation (now owned by OceanaGold) began
exploring gold mining in the Central American country El Salvador.2 Six years later, due
to extreme public outcry regarding the polluted and depleted drinking water, Salvadoran
President Elías Antonio Saca banned mineral mining, and denied all permits, including
Pacific Rim’s.3 Pacific Rim initiated an international arbitration proceeding in 2009 under
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules, stating that
because of Pacific Rim’s investment in the State, El Salvador was bound to issue Pacific
Rim a mining permit.4 Although this seems hardly ground-breaking, large corporations
like Pacific Rim often subject developing nations to arbitrate issues arising from
unsatisfied demands of the investors.5
The central issue in investor-state arbitration is not the submission to arbitrate,6
but the actual arbitral proceedings. Traditional arbitration is known for being private and
secret, away from the media and public scrutiny. This lack of transparency can hurt
developing States’ abilities to make public policy decisions, enforce regulations, and
efficiently use their limited amounts of resources.7 Particularly, a lack of transparency
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during investor-state arbitration hinders fair adjudication on public policy concerns, such
as environmental and economic issues. Recognizing these complications, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a set of
transparency rules (the Rules) in 2014 to encourage more open and public-friendly
arbitration settings.8
This Article will examine the effects of the UNCITRAL transparency rules on
global environmental issues submitted to international arbitration. Part II will briefly
analyze the Rules facially, looking at their general scope and the mechanisms for
ensuring transparent adjudication. Part III will then examine how the Rules can benefit
the public through environmental transparency if applied appropriately. Lastly, Part IV
will analyze how the Rules can promote fair economic play between industrialized
nations’ investors and developing communities from an environmental standpoint.
II. A FACIAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNCITRAL TRANSPARENCY RULES
UNCITRAL is not the first alternative dispute resolution forum to enact
transparency rules.9 However, the construction of the UNCITRAL transparency rules
differs from their predecessors in scope of applicability and mechanisms to ensure
transparent arbitration proceedings.10
A. Scope of the Transparency Rules
First, as seen from the title, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration (the Rules), the Rules only apply to investor-state treaties,
more commonly known as bilateral international treaties (BITs) and multi-lateral
international treaties (MITs).11 Limiting the scope of the Rules to BITs and MITs eases
the duty of the arbitrators when deciding the arbitrability of the Treaty. Nevertheless,
other international treaties may specifically state within the language of the arbitral clause
Schultz, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A
Quantitative Empirical Study, EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2014).
8

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, G.A. Res.
68/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec. 10, 2014) (UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency).
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See Judith Resnik, Feature, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: Diffusing Disputes:
the Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124
YALE L.J. 2804, 2896-99 (2015) (discussing California’s attempt to require the publication of
consumer arbitration information and other states within the United States adoption of similar
laws).
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Id. at 2898.
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UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 1. “The UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Rules on Transparency”) shall apply to
investor-State arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty
providing for the protection of investments or investors (“treaty”) concluded on or after 1 April
2014 unless the Parties to the treaty have agreed otherwise.”
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that the UNCITRAL transparency rules will apply to any arbitration,12 thus
demonstrating UNCITRAL’s intention to create universal rules of transparency.
To further promote transparent and fair arbitration, UNCITRAL requires that the
Rules be applied to every BIT or MIT made on or after April 1, 201413 and encourages
previously made treaties to apply the Rules through agreement.14 Additionally, the Rules
grant great authority to the arbitrators in employing and enforcing the Rules, as well as in
balancing the Rules with the public interest and the need for an efficient and fair
adjudication.15 The only limitations restricting the scope of the Rules resides with the
arbitrators, the original Treaty, and the State’s law.16 Otherwise, the Rules are to be used
as a supplement to other arbitration rules,17 thereby working with additional rules to
encourage the efficacy of arbitration. Such expansive application demonstrates
UNCITRAL’s attempt to treat the Rules as a necessary and significant aspect of the
arbitration process.
Although UNCITRAL implicated seemingly impenetrable transparency rules, the
Rules are subject to exceptions,18 some of which may eventually lead to implementation
problems. Under Article Seven of the Transparency Rules, the scope of the Rules is
limited if there exists protected information that cannot be made public for confidentiality
reasons19 or if such protected information would damage the integrity of the arbitration.20

12

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 9. “These Rules are available for use
in investor-State arbitrations initiated under rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or
in ad hoc proceedings.”
13

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 11, art. I, § 1.

14

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 2. “In investor-State arbitrations
initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty concluded before 1 April
2014, these Rules shall apply only when: (a) The parties to an arbitration (the “disputing parties”)
agree to their application in respect of that arbitration; or (b) The Parties to the treaty or, in the
case of a multi- lateral treaty, the State of the claimant and the respondent State, have agreed after
1 April 2014 to their application.”
15

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 4. “Where the Rules on
Transparency provide for the arbitral tribunal to exercise discretion, the arbitral tribunal in
exercising such discretion shall take into account: (a) The public interest in transparency in treatybased investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing
parties’ interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.”
16

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, §§ 7-9.
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UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 7. “Where the Rules on
Transparency apply, they shall supplement any applicable arbitration rules. Where there is a
conflict between the Rules on Transparency and the applicable arbitration rules, the Rules on
Transparency shall prevail. Notwithstanding any provision in these Rules, where there is a conflict
between the Rules on Transparency and the treaty, the provisions of the treaty shall prevail.”
18

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII.

19

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII, § 1. In order to be deemed
confidentially protected, the information must include secret business dealings or strategies § 2(a),
is protected contractually § 2(b) or by law § 2(c), would inhibit law enforcement if disclosed to the
public § 2(d), or would put the State’s securities at risk § 5.
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Facially, these exceptions seem carefully thought out; however, for example,
consider the exception of contractually protected confidential information.21 Because of
the freedom to contract,22 parties can agree by treaty to avoid the Rules altogether if such
information is deemed confidential by each party. Opponents to this claim may say that
even such contractual language has its limitations as established by Article Seven’s
arbitrator review of the alleged protected information.23 Nevertheless, even though
arbitrators may consult with the parties in determining the importance of not
publicizing,24 the Rules in no way state how the arbitrators are to consider contractual
confidentiality in light of the Rules. Article One specifically states that the Rules are not
to take the place of or trump the original Treaty,25 which when supplemented with Article
Seven, seems to contradict the overarching goal of the Rules.
B. Mechanisms of Transparency
Aside from the questionable exceptions to the Rules, UNCITRAL included three
categories of mechanisms to promote arbitration transparency: the publication of the
arbitration information and documents,26 third person and third party submissions,27 and
public hearings.28 Prior to the Rules, UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings were known for
closed hearings, secret awards, and restricted submissions by third parties.29 Although
20

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII, §§ 6, 7. Submitted items that may
“jeopardize” the fairness and efficiency of the arbitration cannot be made available to the public.
Jeopardizing the integrity of the proceedings include interfering with the collection of evidence,
intimidating witnesses, lawyers, or the tribunal, and other “exceptional circumstances.”
21

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, art. VII, § 2(b).

22

See generally Thomas Carbonneau, Article, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 246 (2005) (discussing how the freedom of contract can
diminish states’ ability to pass effective legislation and regulations).
23

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency , supra note 8, art. VII, § 3. “The arbitral tribunal, after
consultation with the disputing parties, shall make arrangements to prevent any confidential or
protected information from being made available to the public, including by putting in place, as
appropriate: (a) Time limits in which a disputing party, non-disputing Party to the treaty or third
person shall give notice that it seeks protection for such information in documents; (b) Procedures
for the prompt designation and redaction of the particular confidential or protected information in
such documents; and (c) Procedures for holding hearings in private to the extent required by
article 6, paragraph 2. Any determination as to whether information is confidential or protected
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal after consultation with the disputing parties.”
24

Id.

25

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 17, art. I, § 7.

26

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II, III.

27

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, V.

28

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI.

29

See Samuel Levander, Note, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: an Empirical Analysis of the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 506, 517 (2014).
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traditional, such private arbitrations have created a skeptical and untrusting international
public.30 Thus, each UNCITRAL Rule mechanism attempts to foster a reliable and
public-friendly environment that is accessible and informative.
1. Publications
Articles Two and Three of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration outline the types of information to be published, when
the information is to be published, and who is responsible for making the documents
available. Article Two specifically applies to information to be available at the onset of
the arbitral proceedings, while Article Three focuses on the publication of all documents
during the arbitration.31
Under Article Two, the repository32 must publicize the names of the parties in
dispute, the economic industry affected, and the treaty or international contract upon
which the claim is based. This information is to be made available at the beginning of
arbitration,33 similar to when a complaint and answer are filed in court proceedings. After
arbitration has commenced, Article Three lists the various documents that must be
published, unless exempted by Article Seven.34 Other than those particular documents
listed in Section One, the arbitral tribunal has the authority to determine what documents
should be made available to the public.35 Furthermore, the tribunal is also allowed to
request the publications of expert and witness testimony and consult with the disputing
parties to determine what exhibits are to be published.36 Once the arbitral tribunal has
established what documents to publish, it must report to the repository those documents

30

See Robin Emmott, EU Makes Pitch for Arbitration Court to Unblock U.S. Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015, 9:39 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/16/eu-usatrade-idUSL5N11M2BB20150916.
31

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II, III.

32

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VIII (stating that the repository is to
be the Secretary-General of the United Nations or any other institution named by UNCITRAL).
33

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II.

34

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 1. “[T]he following documents
shall be made available to the public: the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of
arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defence and any further written statements or
written sub- missions by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents
and to expert reports and witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the proceedings,
but not the exhibits themselves; any written submissions by the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to
the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where available; and orders, decisions and
awards of the arbitral tribunal.”
35

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 3 (the arbitrators have the
discretion to meet with the disputing parties in order to decide what other materials should be
published, if any).
36

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 2 (the arbitrators are only
limited by Article Seven exemptions).
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so the repository can publish the information in a “timely manner.”37
Both Article Two and Article Three attempt to limit the disputing parties’ power
in deciding what information to share with the public. Investors may argue that such
publications can endanger sensitive business data, strategies, and trade secrets,38 but the
Rules have built in safety nets to ensure protected information stays protected. First, by
consultation with the arbitral tribunal, parties can make a case for why certain
information should not be published or at least needs to be redacted.39 Second, Article
Seven exceptions prohibit arbitrators from publishing confidential business and securities
information. Therefore, UNCITRAL has taken the investors’ arguments seriously and
attempted to shield businesses from the possible harmful effects of public accessibility,
while promoting arbitration as a serious alternative dispute resolution that is consistent,
legitimate, and flexible to the public’s needs.40
2. Submissions
Articles Four and Five govern submissions made by a third person and by a nondisputing third party to the Treaty, respectively.41 The main difference between Articles
Four and Five is the party’s association to the Treaty. A third person who is not a party to
the Treaty in any way is allowed to submit a matter within the scope of the dispute under
Article Four;42 a third party who is subject to the Treaty but is not a part of the dispute is
allowed to submit a matter within the scope of the dispute under Article Five.43
In general, Articles Four and Five allow submissions at the discretion of the
arbitral tribunal, so long as the submissions do not “disrupt” or “unfairly prejudice” the
proceedings or any of the disputing parties.44 Moreover, although the arbitral tribunal has
discretion to allow the submissions, the disputing parties must be given “reasonable

37

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 4 (absent a direct definition of
“timely manner,” the repository would be most likely held to some standard of reasonability).
38

Levander, supra note 29.

39

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 4 (redactions of any published
information must be made according to Article Seven).
40

Levander, supra note 29, at 511.

41

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, V.

42

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 1. “After consultation with the
disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is not a disputing party, and not a
non-disputing Party to the treaty (‘third person(s)’), to file a written submission with the arbitral
tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.”
43

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 1. “The arbitral tribunal shall,
subject to paragraph 4, allow, or, after consultation with the disputing parties, may invite,
submissions on issues of treaty interpretation from a non- disputing Party to the treaty.”
44

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 5. See also UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 4.
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opportunity” to comment on any of the submissions.45
Allowing third party submissions hugely encourages transparency within
arbitration. Part of the problem with traditional arbitration stems from the lack of
adequate data, which then leads to an insufficient amount of information that arbitrators
have as a basis for their award.46 Submissions add to the available information arbitrators
can use to come to a conclusion and grant other parties a chance to argue why they are
affected by this dispute. Not only does the public and other Treaty parties receive an
opportunity to bring their concerns to light, but the third party submissions can also
highlight the benefits that a disputing party brings to the State, the global economy, the
industry, or the public welfare. Such information is invaluable because even though the
dispute may seemingly affect only a few parties, the consequences of the arbitral outcome
could be on a much larger scale; thus, the submissions bring forth ideas and information
that would otherwise go unnoticed.
3. Public Hearings
Article Six of UNCITRAL’s Rules provides the third mechanism for transparent
arbitration. Under Article Six, all evidentiary hearings and all oral arguments are to be
publicly held.47 Additionally, the burden is upon the tribunal to arrange the necessary
logistics to make the arbitration proceedings public, limited by the feasibility of such
arrangements.48 Lastly, Article Six, like Article Seven, protects information that is either
confidential or a threat to the integrity of the arbitration, allowing the arbitral tribunal to
hold partially private hearings.49 Therefore, Article Six places a duty upon the arbitral
tribunal to guarantee that the public has access to the majority of the arbitration while
maintaining the security of traditional arbitration.50
45

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 6. See also UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 5.
46

See generally TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL & NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 78, 549 (Sally Yagan, et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012). Appropriately valuing the
environment takes into account the damages to it as well as the benefits from it. Because these
values are difficult to calculate, more data is essential to placing an actual price tag on the
environment. Additionally, with a lack of transparency in traditional arbitration, the burden of
proof is lower for the plaintiff and thus, information and data are often incomplete and inadequate.
47

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 1. “Subject to article 6,
paragraphs 2 and 3, hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument (“hearings”)
shall be public.”
48

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 3. The arbitral tribunal has only
a duty to meet with the disputing parties to determine the logistics needed, if any, and whether
such logistics would be an impediment to the arbitration.
49

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 2. “Where there is a need to
protect confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process pursuant to article 7, the
arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such
protection.”
50

See generally UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, VII. Questionably, this
limited duty usurps the general finality of the arbitral award. If a party appeals the award based on
lack of public access (an excess of arbitrator authority), what dictates whether the arbitrator failed
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Giving the public the opportunity to observe the arbitral proceedings seems
harmless. However, although the Rules’ critics can argue that publications and
submissions toe the line towards court adjudication, public hearings certainly cross the
fading barrier between arbitration and the common law court. Part of the appeal of
arbitration is its privacy and secretiveness.51 Once those distinguishing characteristics
become evanescent, why would parties even bother to choose arbitration. It can be
contended that arbitration remains beneficial to commercial transactions even with added
public hearings,52 but that is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, parties by and
large will continue to arbitrate within the international world of commercial transaction
so long as some aspect of privacy and secrecy remain.
III. THE TRANSPARENCY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
Traditionally, investor-state arbitration focused on commercial disputes arising
from a Treaty but not including derivative issues, such as environmental problems.53
With the improvement of technology and the expansion of science, commercial
contractual disputes have evolved to include environmental concerns. Unfortunately, the
arbitration setting, prior to the adoption of the transparency rules, was not set up to
resolve environmental claims.54 Lacking the arbitral setting results in arbitral tribunals
either ignoring environmental disputes or inadequately adjudicating environmental
issues.55
By enacting transparency rules, UNCITRAL prescribes value to the
environmental disputes and to the public voice.
to allow the public access? In other words, will the Court still resolve award disputes in favor of
the arbitrator or do the Rules tip the scale in favor of the public? The entirety of the Rules revolves
around the promotion of public awareness and public access, but if the Court continues to favor
the arbitrator, the Rules fail.
51

See generally Robert D. Argen, Note, Ending Blind Spot Justice: Broadening the Transparency
Trend in International Arbitration, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207, 213-221 (2014) (discussing the
difference between privacy – restriction of public access, and confidentiality – restriction of
disclosing information within the proceedings).
52

Samuel Levander, Note, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: an Empirical Analysis of the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 506, 511 (2014) (finding that
transparency decreases uncertainty in arbitral proceedings while increasing its consistency,
democracy, and legitimacy).
53

Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Symposium, Going Green: Managing the
Environment Through International Investment Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT’L REV. 383, 388-89
(2015) (discussing that even if environmental disputes are included in the arbitral clause, language
and custom barriers still pose problems to enforcing the submitted disputes).
54

See Julianne J. Marley, Note, The Environmental Endangerment Finding in International
Investment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1003, 1013-14 (2014) (stating that critics of
traditional arbitration of environmental disputes do not think there are enough procedural
safeguards to protect the public interest).
55

Id. at 1011-13 (examining how the inconsistencies of arbitrators in interpreting and applying
environmental regulations and public interest rights lead to a race to the bottom and have an
overall chilling effect on environmental laws).
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With the adoption of the Rules, environmental concerns are now arbitrable. Under
Article One of UNCITRAL’s transparency rules, any BIT or MIT dispute triggering
UNCITRAL arbitration must apply the transparency rules.56 Thus, any submission of any
arbitrable issue falls within the scope of the Rules, including questions about the
environment. Furthermore, Article One specifically grants authority to the arbitral
tribunal to consider both the disputing parties’ desire for “fair and efficient” adjudication
and the public’s interest in the matters.57 Because arbitrators now have the power to
weigh the public opinion, environmental concerns will stand a better chance of being
adjudicated fully, properly, and resourcefully.58
More important than the scope of the Rules’ application is the manner in which
arbitration will encourage the adjudication of environmental issues. Environmental issues
span a vast range of topics, including natural resources, land use, ocean uses and
pollution, energy, air and water pollution, and climate change.59 Because of the various
topics incorporated in environmental disputes, arbitrators need to have a strategy to fully
collect scientific information and analyze the most current research and data available.
Prior to transparency rules, arbitrators had no incentive to develop a unitary procedure to
rule on environmental disputes, leading to numerous interpretations of treaties and
regulations, conflicting resolutions, and negative effects on developing states.60 With
UNCITRAL’s new Rules on Transparency, arbitrators now have a duty to enforce open
proceedings, increasing the probability of scientific findings being applied more
uniformly and decreasing the likelihood of surprising results. Through the three
transparency mechanisms, environmental disputes will become more consistent, raise
awareness, and reaffirm arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution option.
First, UNCITRAL’s publications will encourage consistency among
environmental arbitrations,61 which in turn will further predictability and efficiency.
Without transparency, the arbitral tribunal has a difficult time uniformly applying
precedent. Specifically, publishing arbitration documents will allow arbitrators to use
56

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 11, art. I, § 1.

57

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 15, art. I, § 4(b).

58

Compare Beharry, et. al., supra note 53, at 429 (discussing the need to balance public interests
of the State with the negative impacts of regulation on international investors), and Marley, supra
note 54, at 1022, 1024, 1031 (analyzing various arbitration procedures for ensuring the proper
adjudication of environmental disputes – expert witnesses, deference to State findings, and third
party amici), with The Honorable Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, Article, What’s in a
Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 727-29 (2014) (arguing that investment
tribunals do not “strike down” the environmental regulations of States). The argument is not that
arbitral tribunals “strike down” environmental regulations but that environmental regulations take
a backseat to the investor’s needs and interests without transparency and public interest safeguards
to adequately adjudicate environmental disputes.
59

Environmental Issues and Solutions to Current Environment Problems, NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/issues/ (last visited May 17, 2016).
60

Marley, supra note 54, at 1017.

61

See generally Levander, supra note 52.
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previous environmental arbitration cases to defend their award, while also allowing the
arbitrators to build upon the science and knowledge of past decisions. Moreover, the
publication mechanism will create a consistent system in which the disputing parties can
prepare to the best of their abilities by looking at precedent arbitrations and effectively
utilizing their resources. Therefore, consistency in arbitration will transitively promote
predictability and efficiency. The more consistent the system becomes, the more
predictable the arbitration setting becomes, leading to a better allocation of arbitral
resources62 and less time being wasted on matters that were previously and properly
adjudicated.
Aside from the advancement of consistency, publications will generate awareness
for environmental issues that would otherwise tend to be ignored or adjudicated
improperly.63 By publishing arbitral materials, UNCITRAL acknowledges that investorstate disputes about commercial enterprises are no longer the only important matters to be
arbitrated. Environmental concerns that would have remained hidden, buried, or
inadequately handled can now surface, bringing forward new questions about how
investor-state relations manage public interest concerns.
Second, the Rules’ submission mechanism will also benefit environmental
arbitration by generating a more informative setting. As mentioned above, environmental
issues are numerous, diverse, and complex.64 By permitting third persons and third
parties to submit documents and information about the environmental dispute in question,
the arbitrators will have more access to data, research, and information about externalities
that would otherwise be difficult to obtain and understand. With additional information,
the arbitrators can render more thorough and decisive awards, thus reestablishing the
finality and overall autonomy of arbitration as an alternative form of adjudication.65
Although finality of an arbitral award may not always favor the public interest side of the
dispute, the submission mechanism within UNCITRAL’s transparency rules will
equilibrate the arbitration setting between corporate investors and developing states by
providing more opportunities to acquire scientific data and present outside opinions.66

62

See Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity
Building to a Level Playing Field?, J. INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 4(1): 83-109 (2013) (discussing how
the allocation of resources during arbitration depends on the economic state of the country and the
assistance that country receives from more developed nations).
63

See generally TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL & NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 78, 550 (Sally Yagan, et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012) (emphasizing the importance of
freedom of information in today’s society).
64

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, Supra note 59.

65

See generally Thomas Carbonneau, Article, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 213-14, 219 (2005) (discussing how judicial review of
the award interferes with arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution).
66

See Beharry, et. al., supra note 53, at 411-18 (suggesting that third party participation creates a
system to better evaluate scientific information) and Marley, supra note 54, at 1022, 1031
(discussing that expert witnesses and third party amici could help alleviate environmental dispute
inconsistencies in arbitration).
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Lastly, the public hearings mechanism provided in UNCITRAL’s transparency
rules is not a device by which the disputing parties can acquire information or arbitrators
can substantiate their awards. Nevertheless, public hearings will benefit arbitration by
demonstrating the reliability of arbitration to the public.67 Part of the debate encircling the
arbitration of environmental disputes is the lack of societal support. Because of the
questionable ethics and practices that investors have exercised in past investor-state
relationships,68 the general public hesitates to embrace traditional international arbitration
that favors secrecy and money over environmental protection and public rights. With
public hearings, arbitration has a chance to make amends with the international
community, reestablishing itself as a trustworthy, reliable, and efficient adjudication
procedure that can take on environmental issues.
Nonetheless, due to the Rules’ built in contract exception in which parties can
agree to keep various information private,69 environmental disputes can still remain
partially or completely concealed. Arbitrators will have to take great care in fulfilling
their new public interest duties when granting this exception so as to ensure that
environmental disputes do not get pushed to the bottom of the barrel and remain in the
stalemate of traditional arbitration. The freedom to contract, although powerful, will
hopefully be limited by legitimate and good faith conflict resolution interests of all
parties and the influence of the interested public sector.
With the advancement of science and technology, more environmental concerns
are likely to follow. Yet, this advancement also leads to better preventative measures and
solutions. If applied appropriately, UNCITRAL’s transparency rules recognize and grant
opportunities for both stages of environmental concerns, providing a proper and efficient
forum for arguing new environmental disputes and solving such disputes with the best
science and technology available.
IV. THE TRANSPARENCY RULES AND ECONOMIC FAIRNESS
There is little doubt that foreign investment in developing countries provides a
foundation for economic growth.70 Nevertheless, investing in developing countries often
comes at the cost of the environment.71 Generally, investors focus on the positive
67

See Robin Emmott, EU Makes Pitch for Arbitration Court to Unblock U.S. Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015, 9:39 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/16/eu-usatrade-idUSL5N11M2BB20150916.
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Corp. v. Canada).
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See generally The Honorable Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, Article, What’s in a
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Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014).
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See generally TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 78 (discussing that the accurate value of
foreign investment is difficult to calculate but must include the offset of negative externalities on
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economic benefits they receive from and bring to developing nations, completely
ignoring the negative externalities that arise from their investments.72 When disputes do
surface about the negative externalities, the secrecy and nontransparency of traditional
arbitration could allow investor corporations to be compensated for not following
environmental regulations.73 Such compensation acts as an award for the investors,
thereby defeating the purpose of environmental regulations and creating a race to the
bottom.74 UNCITRAL’s transparency rules will not only invite the adjudication of
environmental disputes, but the Rules will also level the economic playing field between
financially secure investors and developing states by creating a more predictable forum in
which investors and states have equal access and can be held accountable by the public
for unfair practices.
First, under the Rules’ publications mechanism, arbitration becomes more
predictable.75 Previously published arbitral materials can be used by all disputing parties
to strategically and economically allocate their resources. For instance, if the precedent
establishes a pattern on one type of environmental regulation or concern, parties can
focus their energy, time, and money on proving the precedent applies, or decide that their
resources would be better spent on a different argument. By having a chance to strategize
and prepare, transparent arbitration enables disputing parties to pick and choose how they
want to present the best argument, no longer expending their resources on guessing how
the arbitrators will rule.76 Publications grant equal access to previous arbitration
materials, present parties with choices, and give developing nations an opportunity to
utilize their limited resources efficiently.
Additionally, submissions and public hearings work in tandem to create an
arbitration setting that encourages fair economic practices. Both submissions and public
hearings generate a system in which the symbiotic relationships between investors and
72
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states are rewarded but unfair practices and improper ethics are penalized.77 Primarily,
submissions by third persons and third parties encourage disputing parties to account for
both benefits and costs of transactions78 while the transparency of the submissions, in
addition to the public hearings, utilizes freedom of information79 to pressure the parties
and the arbitrators into ensuring the fairness of the agreement and the resolution.
Freedom of information is a key mantra for living in today’s fast paced and everchanging society.80 Traditional arbitration fails to embrace the modernity of the
availability of information, and now arbitration tribunals are rapidly attempting to adapt
arbitration to the current needs of the millennial generation.81 Although traditional
arbitration’s privacy may continue to work for private commercial transactions, with the
growth of interlocking worldwide connections among businesses, consumers, and the
general public, such privacy acts as a red flag to individuals who value knowledge and
awareness. This value is the pressure that encourages investor-state arbitration to balance
economic anomalies that arise due to the traditional notion of commercial dispute
resolution. Moreover, freedom of information activates a type of checks and balances by
encouraging the public to take part in the disputes, both through submissions and public
hearings. Such mechanisms allow public scrutiny, which elevates the burden of proof for
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the investor within the arbitral setting.82 With an elevated burden of proof, financially
secure parties cannot easily overbear and outmaneuver financially weaker parties.
Although freedom of information certainly pushes investor-state arbitration
towards a more open and public forum where an economic equilibrium becomes a
possibility, what happens when a party raises the affirmative defense and arbitral cliché
of freedom to contract? As explained above in Part II, the UNCITRAL transparency rules
allow exceptions to publishing documents.83 In order to ensure that the Rules promote
economic fairness, arbitrators will have a renewed duty to question and analyze BITs and
MITs and to balance the investors’ interests in financial security with the States’ interests
in achieving economic goals through environmentally conscious practices. No longer will
arbitrators be able to award solely on the basis of the Treaties’ words, which often favor
the investor,84 with freedom of contract as their rationale. Freedom of information will
allow the public to take a stance for the weaker party and bring forth a new wave of
influential interest in economic practices and investment fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
The El Salvador and Pacific Rim conflict has been an ongoing international
dilemma for the past six years.85 Generally, arbitration is desired for handling
international commercial disputes because it is less costly than court proceedings, private
and formatted for industrial and commercial relationships, and much more efficient than
typical court adjudication.86 Six years is not efficient and creates more costs as the parties
draw out the proceedings, so is traditional arbitration suitable for every international
dispute? The answer, of course, is no. But although this seems obvious, reforming
traditional arbitration that is specifically shaped to commercial transactions and not only
to investor-state transactions remains difficult and controversial.
UNCITRAL’s Rules on Transparency attempt to push arbitration towards a more
transparent, open, and accessible adjudicatory pathway. Whether these Rules will
actually balance the inequality within the arbitral system will depend on how well they
are applied and how consistently they are applied. Furthermore, even though UNCITRAL
82
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enacted the Rules, other international arbitration tribunals have yet to follow suit. Thus,
those parties that wish to avoid transparent proceedings only have to contractually agree
to use another arbitral forum. Nevertheless, UNCITRAL’s Rules underscore the
international community’s recognition of the need for evolving adjudication. Stagnant
processes and systems never survive changing times and arbitration will not be the
exception. This is particularly true with the advancement of technology and science.
Currently, environmental disputes are rarely arbitrated,87 raising concerns about
arbitration’s inability to adjudicate public interest issues. With new and advancing
science and technology, however, environmental issues will need a stage for resolution.
Arbitration could very well be that stage so long as the traditional notion of arbitration
does not forcefully impose itself into environmental matters.
Unlike commercial transactions that have historically remained contractually
based upon typically rigid and unchanging rules, the environment is a complex system
that is constantly varying and being manipulated. An adjudicatory system that does not
appreciate and cannot bend to certain needs of specific issues will not last as a prominent
alternative in the international society. UNCITRAL’s transparency rules are the first step
towards modernizing and shaping arbitration into an adjudicatory method that welcomes
environmental disputes and public interest. By creating a set of rules that encourages
arbitrators and parties to take full advantage of past arbitral decisions, UNCITRAL
recognizes that science builds upon itself and economic resources are not equally
distributed. As more environmental disputes arise from investor-state relations,
transparent proceedings will become more valuable in addressing public concerns while
maintaining efficiency. The Rules help demonstrate arbitration’s capacity to take on
environmental issues and combat unfair economic practices, two fields that often go
hand-in-hand.88 Through three transparency mechanisms – publications, submissions, and
public hearings – arbitration now promotes environmental conflict resolution, efficient
allocation of resources, and freedom of information.
Although the El Salvador and Pacific Rim dispute is governed under the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),89 the dispute
beautifully portrays the limitations of traditional arbitration, both economically and
environmentally. The outcome of this specific set of arbitral proceedings will determine
the significance of State sovereignty, the role of the public, and the amount of concern for
the environment on an international level. Arbitration has an opportunity to embrace
modernizing. To remain a legitimate alternative dispute resolution system, arbitration,
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and those who play within its realm, must welcome transparency with gumption and
vigor.
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